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According, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's findings that Kinnear 
failed to take adequate measures to prevent or correct the accumulation of water in the 
lazarette and that Northern Queen had satisfied all the elements of the primary duty rule. 
The dissenting opinion in this case agreed with the majority on most issues except 
for its treatment of the third prong of the primary duty rule. The dissent felt that the 
record supported the finding that Kim1ear had been negligent, not that he had knowingly 
violated his duty, and did not agree with the finding that Northern Queen had satisfied the 
primary duty rule. 
Mariya Link 
AN INJURY SUFFERED ON SHORE MUST BE CAUSED BY A DEFECTIVE APPURTENANCE 
OF A Sl-llP ON NAVIGABLE WATERS UNDER THE ADMIRAL TV EXTENSION ACT 
Summary judgment was properly granted for the defendants against the plaintiff 
who suffered a back injury while unloading groceries and supplies for an oil 
platform from the back of an improperly loaded box. 
Dahlen v. Gulf Crews, Inc. 
281 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(Decided February 4, 2002, cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 261 (2002)) 
Plaintiff Peter Dahlen ("Dahlen"), an employee of Island Operating assigned to 
work as a barge operator for the Forest Oil Corporation's ("Forest") platforms in the Gulf 
of Mexico was told on July 6, 1995 to pick up a grocery order. The order had been 
placed with Universal Ogden Services ("Universal") by Forest on July 5th for 3 
platforms, West Cameron 44, High Island 116, and High Island 820. The groceries had 
been loaded into an eight-foot square metal cube called a "grocery box". They were 
transported by truck from Universal to a dock in Sabine Pass, Louisiana, then loaded onto 
the MIV Billy Jay, which was owned by Gulf Crews, Inc. and Gulf Marine Services, Inc. 
(collectively, "Gulf') had been time chartered by Forest to be taken to its offshore 
platforms. Dahlen was told to go to West Cameron 44 to perfonn routine maintenance 
and unload the groceries. When he opened the box, he found that the supplies for West 
Cameron 44 had been loaded in the back of the grocery box. Because the box only had 
one door, Dahlen had to take everything out to get the West Cameron 44 groceries out 
and then replace the supplies for the other platforms. Dahlen claimed that this caused 
him to suffer a back injury, for which he had to return to shore the following day. 
Eventually he had to undergo lumbar fusion surgery to stabilize his back. 
Dahlen filed suit for negligence on May 2, 1996 in Louisiana state court, naming 
Gulf, Universal, and Forest as defendants. The defendants removed the action on May 
28, 1996 to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction under the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"). Gulf and Universal were granted motions for 
summary judgment based on the grounds that they owed no legal duty to Dahlen. Forest 
was granted summary judgment based on the claim of platform liability, but was denied 
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summary judgment on the claim against it as time charterer. A jury found Forest was not 
negligent. Dahlen appeals the findings. 
Application of the Admiralty Extension Act 
The court first found that there clearly was federal jurisdiction and the application 
of maritime law was proper under OCSLA. It then turned to de novo review of the 
district court's application of the Admiralty Extension Act. It notes that in order to apply 
the Admiralty Extension Act when a plaintiff is injured on shore, they must allege that 
the cause was "a defective appurtenance of a ship on navigable waters." Margin v. Sea­
Land Services, Inc., 812 F.2d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1987). The court then turned to its 
analysis of Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., in which the Supreme Court applied 
the Extension Act to a longshoreman injured on a dock by defective cargo containers. 
373 U.S. 206 (1963). However, the court in this case found that Gutierrez did not control 
based on 3 factors. First, the two situations are factually different. In Gutierrez, the 
cargo was being unloaded, not already on the dock. Second, none of the case law deals 
with the Extension Act working in conjunction with the OCSLA, which already has 
provisions to deal with state law. Third, for the Extension Act to apply, the defect must 
be in the appurtenance and not be due to the person perfonning services for the vessel. 
This leads the court to conclude that the Extension Act did not apply. It further noted that 
applying Louisiana state substantive law does not affect the outcome of the case. 
The District Court's Jury Instructions Regarding Negligence 
The court noted first that it reverses judgments based on a jury instruction "only if 
the charge as a whole creates a substantial doubt as to whether the jury has been properly 
guided in its deliberations." Dahlen requested that the jury be given instructions as to the 
"eggshell skull" doctrine, stating that if a defendant's negligence causes unforeseeable 
injuries, the defendant will still be liable. The district court declined to include this in its 
charge. On this appeal, however, the court says the defendant must be found negligent 
first, so the instructions were not in error. 
The District Court's Jury Instructions Regarding Forest's Duty 
Dahlen claimed that the instructions to the jury were improper for the duty owed 
by a time charterer. The charge to the jury stated: 
The vessel charterer has the legal duty to exercise only reasonable care to 
have the vessel and cargo in such condition that the platform owner and its 
employees and workers would be able by the exercise of reasonable care 
to carry on the work of unloading the cargo with reasonable safety to 
persons and property. The charterer has no duty to supervise or inspect 
the loading or unloading of the cargo or to warn of open and obvious 
conditions. 
Dahlen contended that the court should not have used this standard. Instead, Dahlen felt 
that the applicable standard was that from Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., which stated that 
case law "establishes that the traditional spheres of activity in which a time charterer 
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exercises control and thus owes a duty include choosing a vessel's cargo, route, and 
general mission, as well as the specific time in which the vessel will perform its 
assignment." 87 F.3d 1512, 1520 (5th Cir. 1996). The court, however, factually 
distinguished Hodgen from this case because the Hodgen line of case law generally 
involves the transfer of cargo from vessel to platform, or vice versa, and in perilous 
weather conditions. It was unwilling to extend Hodgen to this set of facts. The court 
relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., that the 
duty of a vessel to warn of latent defects is a narrow one. 512 U.S. 92, 105 (1994). It 
concluded that the lower court did not abuse discretion by issuing the charge it did. 
The Jury's Findings 
The court gave substantial deference to a jury's decision in saying that it would 
overturn the jury's findings only if it believed that reasonable jurors could not have 
arrived at the conclusion they did. Dahlen said they could not have come to the 
conclusion that Forest was negligent due to the rule of "first in-last out" in loading 
grocenes. The court did not find that this overcomes the deference it gives to jury 
decisions. 
Granting Summary Judgment for Universal 
The court reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Universal 
de novo. In reviewing Louisiana state case law, it found that there is no duty owed by the 
grocer to label boxes as to weight, but only to properly pack groceries. It noted that 
federal maritime Jaw has adopted this Restatement Second of Torts approach to "legal 
cause." It also determined that Universal did not know the order of delivery, so it was 
under no affim1ative duty to pack the groceries in any specific order. Thus, the court 
concluded that there was no duty and the grocer could not have been negligent and 
summary judgment was properly granted. 
The District Court's Dismissal of Forest's Cross-Claim for Indemnity 
The court determined that it could review the interpretation of the indemnity 
clause de novo. For Forest to win, it must first have proved that Dahlen's injury arose out 
of or was related to perfom1ance of the vessel charter. Under Gulfs charter, the 
indemnification only gets triggered when the injury arises out of or is related to the 
performance of the vessel during the charter. The district court found this did not meet 
that standard and the appellate court agreed. Dahlen did not have any contact with the 
M/V Billy Jay nor did the vessel's crew go onto the platfonn. Second, Forest would have 
had to prove that Dahlen, a borrowed servant of Forest, was not a Forest employee for the 
purposes of the insurance clause in the time charter. The court concluded that Forest was 
seeking indemnification from a third party that had no contact with Dahlen. Thus, the 
dismissal was proper. 
Jason Nielson 
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